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I. INTRODUCTION

California's energy crisis represented a profound moment in
energy policy, crisis management and environmental justice.
California's deregulation led to blackouts and rapid increases in
ratepayer bills that eventually fueled the Governor's declaration
of emergency and emergency legislation by the State Legislature.
Lessons about deregulation, crisis management and
environmental justice abound.
This article is not an attempt to systematically and
comprehensively analyze California's energy deregulation. It
instead focuses on the repercussions of crisis management,
particularly as it relates to environmental justice.
There are implications for our society beyond energy policy in
California's energy experiment, especially at a time of national
crisis management to address the terrorist threat. Even in a
state that prided itself on its progressiveness and demographic
diversity, people of color were the first to suffer in a time of crisis.
At the same time, democratic rights such as public participation
in environmental decision-making were easily eroded. Even
more alarming, after the crisis abated, governmental leaders
empowered by emergency authority are now resisting giving up
their new power. Now it appears that mistakes made in the
crisis will have consequences far into the future.
II. CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATION EXPERIMENT

California's deregulation scheme was superficially brilliant in
design, though fatally flawed. The basic goal was to reduce
prices. l While historically, one could question the need to fix a
system that had dramatically reduced energy prices over one
hundred years,2 California's prices remained relatively high, and
business in particular, welcomed the siren's call that competition
could reduce prices still further.3
1 See California Public Utilities Commission, The California Public Utilities
Commission
Answers
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/statiC/industry/electric/electric+restructuringlhistorical
+informationlfaqs.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002).
2 See Figure 1, Average residential price of electricity, 1892 to 1997 in Hirsh
and Serchuk, Power Switch, Will the Restructured Electric Utility System Help
the Environment, 41 Environment 7 at 4-9 (1999).
3 The California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") estimated that
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California's deregulation was ushered in by the California
Legislature through Assembly Bill 1890 on September 23, 19964
and by the State's Public Utilities Commission (Preferred Policy
Decision (D.95-12-063, as modified by D.96-01-009). Its primary
feature was to have the sale and pricing of electricity
deregulated.5 California's business would have direct access to
generators of electricity. Prices were to be deregulated over a
four-year period oftime.6 To assure that competition would drive
prices down, a substantial portion (at least 50%) of fossil fuel
power generation (nuclear and hydroelectric were excluded) was
ordered to be divested from regulated utilities. Further, to
encourage new investment in new generation, anyone would be
allowed to set up a power plant without a showing that it was
needed, as under the old regulatory regime. At the same time,
brokers would be allowed to purchase electricity and sell it retail
to consumers or businesses directly. A power exchange, managed
by a non-profit board, would conduct a market where electricity
could be bought and sold. Except for direct access for business,
long-term contracts were not allowed to foster competition.
In addition, to protect utility shareholders whose regulated
capital investments may not have been appropriate for a
deregulated market, a stranded assets account was created to
repay utilities for assets that would be undervalued by the
market. 7 To fund the account, the legislature authorized a
transition charge paid by ratepayers, based upon the assumption
that the assets were worth about twenty-eight billion dollars. If
the assets were sold and the proceeds were more than estimated,
the excess amount would be returned to the account to the
benefit ofratepayers.8
national electricity costs were 30-50% lower than California's prior to
deregulation.
CPUC, How Electric Industry Change Affects You
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/staticf.mdustry/electridelectric+restructuringlhistorical
+informationlplain.htm> (accessed Feb. 18, 2002).
4 See Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 23, 1996) available
online
at
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/publ95-961billlasmlab_18511900/ab_1890_bill_960924_chaptered.pdf> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002).
5 In fact California was not purely deregulated. Among other things, as
discussed below, while the State's control receded, the federal government
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission retained authority to
regulate prices.
6 See Hirsch, supra n. 2.
7 Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at §10(s).
8 Id. (outlining the charges associating the transition to a competitive
generation market).
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To protect ratepayers from these additional costs, a rate
reduction of 10% and freeze were implemented until the market
was created and prices were fully deregulated. 9 The freeze was
financed through the issuance of $6.6 billion in bonds.1O To
protect alternative generation suppliers (e.g., wind and solar)
who could not initially compete in an open market, the
legislature authorized transitional subsidies in the amount of
$540 million that would be phased out over a five-year period as
the market was implemented,u
Finally, to assure reliability, the Legislature created a nonprofit Independent System Operator ("ISO"), governed by a board
of utilities, brokers, consumers and businesses, to manage the
grid. 12 The ISO would assure the day-to-day operations of the
grid as well as oversee the maintenance and expansion of
transmission systems. 13 The utilities would still own and
maintain the transmission systems under ISO oversight and be
responsible to assure that electricity was distributed to
businesses and homes, however, in order to receive their
transition charges they had to submit control of their
transmission systems to the ISO.14
Thus everyone won. Business and residents would have
multiple sellers in a competitive market driving down prices.
Utilities would have their stranded costs paid for by ratepayers
and taxpayers. Residents would be assured that the payoff of
stranded costs would not increase prices in the short-run and
competition would control prices in the long run. Non-utility
generators were assured they could get into the market without
monopoly control from the old utilities and with little regulation.
Brokers were free to buy and sell electricity.15 Alternative
generators were given a cushion to ease transition into a market
economy.
There were major flaws in this well-crafted program. First,
9 Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at § 1(b)(2); see also Hirsch,
supra n. 2.
10 Id. at
§ 8(3)(b) (noting that the total amount of rate reduction bonds
should not exceed ten billion dollars).
11 Id.
at §10, Art. 381(c)(3) (describing funding for operation and
development).
12 See generally Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (providing insight
about the creation ofISO and its function).
13 Id. (listing general obligations and duties of the ISO).
14 See Id. at § 12 (referencing the control of the ISO over publicly owned
utilities).
15 Id. at §10 (defining brokers' abilities).
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there was a nalve assumption regarding the requirements for a
functioning electricity market. Markets require efficiency to
produce stable prices. IS
Efficiency requires sufficient
participants, sufficient products and ease in distributing
products. The converse is that a small number of participants
who have monopoly control over the distribution of products in a
situation of scarcity can dramatically affect the market (market
power).
In California, the margin between electrical supply and
demand during peak demand hours is razor thin. Even with
divestment, a small number of companies dominate power
supply. By 1999 approximately two-thirds of private utility
assets had been sold to private companies. Diversified, global,
out-of-state-headquartered
corporations
(AES,
Houston,
Southern, NRG, Dynegy, and Duke) owned eighty-eight percent
of these assets. Only seven percent was divested to a California
company, Calpine-a San Jose based business focused on
relatively clean energy technologies, combine-cycle natural gas
and geothermal, though its output through construction of new
power plants is rapidly expanding. 17
Power supply is constrained by a congested transmission
system that cannot efficiently deliver electricity from everywhere
to everywhere in the state, let alone across the country. The
result is that if one or more companies withhold electricity
during peak hours, whether due to planned or unplanned
maintenance or attempts to game the market, prices can
skyrocket.
Secondly, there was a failure to fully grasp the impact of a
dramatic change in electrical policy in a climate of regulated
monopolies. Once it became apparent that California was
heading towards deregulation, the utilities had no incentive to
build power plants. At the same time, an outside company was
faced with too much uncertainty until deregulation was
hammered out in the legislature to commit to investing. The
result was that few power-generating facilities were built in the
decade before deregulation.
This problem would not have been an issue if conservation
proceeded apace. But while deregulation provided subsidies to
16 See California Energy Commission, Electric Generation Diuestiture in
California <http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/divestiture.html> (accessed
Jan. 28, 2000).
17Id.
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alternative companies, it removed the incentive for utilities to
fund conservation efforts. Conservation spending took a nosedive after deregulation. It eroded state commitments to demand
side management ("DSM") even before its formal onset in 1998:
After the CPUC announcement in 1994 of the transition to
restructuring, uncertainty about the future of DSM incentives led
the utilities to dramatically cut DSM budgets. In 1996, AB 1890
set annual funding at this relatively lower level. 18

Statewide funding for utility DSM programs peaked at $500M
in 1994, and was down to $270 M by 1999. As a result, the
California Energy Commission ("CEC") found "the contribution of
energy efficiency programs to reduce demand continues to
decline." 19
The deregulation effort to protect, if not promote renewables
was similarly flawed. Renewables already had taken a
substantial blow from the onset of deregulation. Investors and
operators saw little need to support such production based upon
the expected price fall under deregulation that would make
renewables uncompetitive. Deregulation statutes had allocated
$540 million for the transition period, less than two percent of
the funds allocated to bailout the regulated utilities from their
stranded costs. As stated by two key energy advisors to the
Governor, Michael Kahn (Electricity Oversight Board chairman)
and Loretta Lynch (CPUC chairperson):
In the AB 1890 negotiations, proponents of renewable energy
supplies and energy efficiency won legislated funding for
energy efficiency renewable resources. However, pursuing a
competitive market structure, policy makers made funding for
these programs a low priority. The current funding for these
programs is almost 70% less than it was in the early 1980s.20

The result was a process that discouraged the building of
power generation, provided no incentives to improve the
18 CEC,
California
Energy
Outlook
2001
<www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/divestiture> (accessed Mar. 6, 2001).
19 Id.
20 Michael Kahn and Loretta Lynch. California's Electricity Options and
Challenges: Report to Governor Gray Davis (Summer 2000) at § 4; see also
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedlreportlGOV_REPORT.htm#TopOfPage>
(accessed Apr. 21 2002).
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transmission system, dampened conservation and the
development of alternative renewable sources, and allowed power
generators to dramatically affect prices to their profit. Instead of
a market, the pieces were in place to assure blackouts, not only
at a peak demand period in the summer but in the dead of
winter.
The one safeguard built into deregulation was the authority
vested in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
to assure reasonable prices.21 However, FERC was governed by a
board that was ideologically fixed on the market solving all
problems.22 FERC failed to control prices at peak periods until it
was too late, guaranteeing an incentive for those whom
intentionally or accidentally withheld power in those moments.23
FERC actions underscored a fundamental misunderstanding
about electricity. Electricity may be a commodity that ought to
be suitable for a market, but it is also a necessity. Low-income
elderly individuals on fixed incomes may die during the winter
months if the elderly forego payment of their utility bills to save
money for groceries. Small businesses may be bankrupt in a
week if utility bills skyrocket. Unlike pencils or apples or tennis
rackets, electricity may not be ignored or substituted for if prices
skyrocket, providing a market control over volatility. Demand is
inelastic, providing the opportunity for a dramatic increase in
price if supply slackens.
Equally important, electricity being a necessity becomes a
political issue. Politicians will not stand by, waiting for the
market volatility to subside before acting. Electricity was thus ill
suited for traditional and uncontrolled market economics. It is
no wonder that California's brand of deregulation failed and
government eventually stepped in to stop the hemorrhaging.

III. CALIFORNIA'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE
While the question of whether Governor Davis waited too long
to respond is beyond the scope of this article, the main point is
21 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(e); see also In Re California Power Exchange, 245 F.3d
1110 (9th Cir. 2001).
22 See Marshall Wilson and Zachery Coile, Start Digging, Energy Chief Tells
State; He says new power plants, not prices caps are the answer, The S.F. Chron.
A3 (Apr. 12, 2001); see generally Lynda Gledhill and Robert Salladay, Dauis
Threatens to Sue Regulators to Get Price Limits, The S.F. Chron. A8 (May 30,
2001).
23 See San Diego Electric Co., FERC P61, 275 (May 25, 2001) (discussing
FERC's eventual attempts to control prices).
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that eventually he did respond. He responded by proclaiming
pursuant to his authority under Government Code § 8550 et seq.,
a state of emergency on January 17, 2001.24 He soon followed
with several executive orders.25
The declaration of emergency and several of the Governor's
executive orders required the rapid progression of power plant
licensing. Indeed, once the Governor declares an emergency
regarding energy supply, the Energy Commission has the
authority to "authorize the construction and use of generating
facilities under such terms and conditions as specified by the
commission to protect the public interest."26 Thus the Governor's
declaration opened the door for disregarding all procedural and
substantive safeguards in power plant licensing.
To address the possibility of price gouging, Governor Davis
sought price caps and refunds at FERC and had his attorney
general investigate the withholding of capacity at critical
moments resulting in blackouts. To address a growth in the
demand for electricity, Davis and the state legislature took
various measures to provide incentives for conservation and
launched a public information campaign. The Governor's Public
Utilities Commission also ended the price freeze with new rates
that not only provided additional revenues for utilities now
facing bankruptcy, but also, provided an additional disincentive
for wasteful usage of electricity. To address price volatility, his
Department of Water Resources signed new long-term contracts
at a price well below peak prices but way above historical prices.
All of these steps seem reasonable. However upon closer
examination many of the steps are quite disturbing. The longterm contracts, for example, did not include any escape clause if
prices radically changed. In fact, prices have come dramatically
down, yet Californians must now pay for electricity that no one
needs at prices way above market value. 27
However, particularly of concern in this article are the
24 Governor
Davis,
Executive
Order
D-40-01
<http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsitelmsdocslpress_releaselproc_EO_40.doc>
(accessed Mar. 6, 2002).
25 Welcome to California <http://www.governor.ca.gov> (accessed Mar. 6,
2002) (listing recent executive orders through the press room link).
26 Cal. Pub. Res. Code §25705 (West 2002).
27 Mark Martin and Lynda Gledhill, The Energy Crunch A Year Later; Paying
the price of power: After the state spends billions, PG&E faces bankruptcy and
rates soar, the cost of keeping the lights on hits home, The S.F. Chron. Al (Dec.
23,2001).
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emergency orders and legislation that was adopted and still in
effect speeding up power plant licensing, even now as the crisis
ebbs. The effect of these orders has been to bank California's
energy portfolio upon privately owned natural gas-powered
power plants,28 disproportionately in communities of color. Siting
decisions are further being made without meaningful public
participation and with fewer environmental protections. As a
result of the Governor's approach, California's energy future will
be leveraged upon one source of polluting fuel, dominated by
private companies still operating in a deregulated though not as
free market.

IV. THE REAL REASON FOR BLACKOUTS
All of the evidence now available points to the underlying
causes of blackouts in California. Energy assets that were
available were oflline and the rest could not efficiently distribute
their electricity through inadequate transmission lines. The
reasons for facilities being oflline are in dispute-necessary
maintenance being the main excuse that is offered by power
companies. Whether the blackout occurred at a low demand time
in December or a high demand in June, the issue was a
mismatch of available supply and demand, not an absolute lack
of supply:
The lights went out in the Bay Area in part because nine
power plants were out of service, either for scheduled
maintenance or repairs, or were operating at limited
capacity. PG&E could not import enough power to make up
for the lost generation because the region has limited
transmission facilities over which to import power.29

Indeed California recorded high prices even in the low
demand month of December. December 2000 wholesale prices hit
$425.59, more than ten times the amount in the previous year,
and about double the price just a few months before at the height
of the hot summer months in August, when peak usage was
28 See Roberta Mendonca, Presentation-April 15, 1999 Santa Teresa Citizen
Action
Group
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl1999-0415-public_adviser.html> Oast updated July 19, 2001) (noting that prior to
deregulation California had a diverse portfolio of energy sources: 30% natural
gas, 21% coal, 23% large hydroelectric, 15% nuclear and 11% renewable).
29 See 16 U.S.C. § 5.
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about 20% greater. 30
What explains the December 2000 peak, when a Stage 3 alert
was called? Power producers had taken 8,988 megawatts (MW)
off-line, a substantial sum considering that peak usage at that
time was about 31,200 MW.31 The total operational capacity of
the three major utilities in California in 1999 was 41,749 MW.32
Whether it was due to so-called "planned maintenance",
unplanned maintenance, or outright gaming of the system, the
December prices and alert were more a result of the imbalance
between supply and demand rather than the absolute inadequacy
of supply.
Because the issue is related to an imbalance, not an absolute
lack of supply, as well as transmission congestion, the solution is
not simply increasing supply. Indeed, the December blackout
demonstrates that a mismatch can occur even when potential
supply is 50% greater than demand, including non-utilities and
imports. The solution is control over supply, not the amount of
supply, and the efficient distribution of electricity. It may not be
just a coincidence that once the California Attorney General and
the State Legislature began to put heavy investigative pressure
on the withholding of capacity that the energy crisis began to
abate. 33
Centralizing control in the state or in a regulated monopoly is
one answer to the imbalance. California indeed had regulated
monopolies before and returning to that regime was one choice
not seriously considered by Governor Davis. Another approach is
30 See Christian Berthelsen & Scott Winokur, Soaring Electric Use More
Fiction Than Fact; Chronicle investigation finds power companies manipulate
data to excuse their towering rates, The S.F. Chron. Al (Mar. 11,2001); see also
CEC,
Wholesale
Electricity
Price
Review
(Dec.
2000)
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/wepr/2000-121index.html> (accessed Mar.
7,2002).
31 CEC, Statewide Average Daily forced or Scheduled Megawatts Off-Line by
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/1999Month
2001_monthly_ofOine.html> (accessed Feb. 14, 2002).
32 CEC, 1999 Operational Capacity of California's Three (Major) InvestorOwned
Utilities
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/operational_capacity.html>
(accessed
Mar. 7,2002).
33 See George Skelton, Lockyer Prefers Action over Talk in Power Crisis, L.A.
Times A3 (Apr. 2, 2001); see also Carl Ingram, Senate Panel Lashes Out at 2
Energy firms; Hearings: Lawmakers hold Enron and Mirant in contempt for
refusing to help in pricing probe, L.A. Times Al (June 29, 2001) (discussing the
various efforts taken by the investigative committee to resolve the energy crisis
in California).
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to literally give power to the people, creating a climate where
Californians put solar or wind power on their homes,
governmental buildings and businesses so they are in control and
electricity need not be distributed over transmission lines.
Efforts to bolster efficiency and conservation also reduce the
stranglehold of centralized power sources.
Amazingly Davis, for all of his bluster about illegal price
activity by out of state companies, never seemed to consider any
approach that would significantly divest or diversify generation
from, as Governor Davis put it, "the pirate generators and power
brokers who are gouging California consumers."34 Davis in effect
preserved the deregulated ownership of power capacity in
centralized fossil fuel power plants.3s
The net result is that the same economic structure that
contributed to the blackouts remains in effect.
Private
companies with incentives to raise prices to increase profits
continue to control power generation in California. Power
generation is dominated by centralized fossil fuel generators and
transmission upgrades or capacity is on the back burner.
Further, to the extent increased prices were a result of
volatility in natural gas prices,36 Davis' approach only further
exacerbates the potential problem. His executive orders that
were directed toward speeding up power plant licensing could
only benefit natural gas producers, as environmental laws now
prohibit or discourage other sources of fossil fuel or nuclear
power in California. These facilities already have distribution
infrastructure in place that have been paid for by ratepayers for
decades, and therefore have an advantage over other
technologies such as decentralized solar or wind. Davis' token
subsidies for alternatives pales in comparison to the inherent
subsidies now in place for centralized fossil fuel electrical
generation.
The biggest concern in this article is that the California
response to the crisis led by Governor Davis had significant
34 Thomas Hargrove, Energy crisis edicts issued, Regulators 'soft-cap' prices;
Davis furious, Ventura County Star Al (Ventura County, Cal.) (Dec. 16, 2000).
35 See Bernadette Tansey, The Energy Crunch; A Year Later; Deregulation
(sort of) lives on in state; Future contours of electricity system still subject to
changes, The S.F. Chron. Al (Dec. 25, 2001) (reporting the continued reliance
on deregulated private sources of energy).
36 See Martin, supra n. 27 (quoting the following "soaring natural gas prices,
a dearth of hydroelectric power from the Northwest and scores of power plants
shuttered for maintenance created the unstable market").
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consequences for environmental justice. Because he undermines
environmental justice for the sake of a policy that fails to address
the underlying problems of the crisis, he makes more dramatic
the fragile nature of this new doctrine in a time of crisis.
V. CALIFORNIA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE

Environmental justice has evolved as a policy doctrine in law
beginning with President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 of
February 11, 1994.37
The accompanying Memorandum,38
suggested implementing the Order through enforcement of two
key statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")39
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 Soon thereafter,
the Council on Environmental Quality issued its Environmental
Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy
Act.41 The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("USEPA") followed in April 1998 with its Final Guidance for

Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA
Compliance Analysis. 42
USEPA took the lead among federal agencies in proposing
specific guidelines for implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act as a key strategy for establishing environmental justice. In
2000, it adopted two related documents detailing how it would
evaluate Title VI complaints-the Draft Revised Guidance for
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging
Permits (Draft revised Investigation Guidance) and its Draft Title
VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering
Environmental
Permitting
Programs
(Draft
Recipient
Guidance}. 43
See 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
See William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12998- Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,
30 Wkly. Compo Pres. Doc. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (1994).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d).
41 See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice Guidance
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 10, 1997)
<http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepalregs/ej/ej.pdf> (accessed Mar. 5, 2002).
42 U.S. EPA, Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in
EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis (1998) (stating that the primary goal of
NEPA is to make certain that federal agencies while in pursuit of their missions
do not fail to consider the effects of their actions on the environment).
43 U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients
Administering Environmental Permitting Programs <Draft Recipient Guidance)
37
38
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California, in response to these federal initiatives, soon
followed with its own environmental justice statute. Governor
Davis signed legislation adopting a California environmental
justice policy on October 6, 1999. The Solis bill provided in part:
"[E]nvironmental justice" means the fair treatment of
people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.~

A key principle in environmental justice is public participation.
In 1991, the seminal First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington D.C. included
as one of its principles of environmental justice lithe right to
participate as equal partners at every level of decision~making
including needs assessment, planning, implementation,
enforcement and evaluation."45
The Executive Order and the accompanying Memorandum
emphasized public participation. The Order at § 1~103 required
each federal agency to develop as part of its environmental
strategy "public participation practices" that "ensure greater
public participation."46 The Memorandum called for each federal
agency to "provide opportunities for community input in the
NEPA process... including improving the accessibility of
meetings, crucial documents, and notices. "47
The EPA has given particular emphasis to public participation,
to the extent that a Title VI violation could be found on public
participation grounds alone. 48 The EPA has even proposed
and Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65
Fed. Reg. 39650-39654 (June 27, 2000) (explaining the purpose of the
documents for clarifying Title VI compliance requirements for citizens and
agencies).
44 Cal. Govt. Code § 65040.12 (e).
45 Race,
Poverty and the Environment, Fall 1991 at 31-32
<http://www.urbanhabitatprogram.org/publications.htm> (accessed Mar. 7,
W~

~

~

<http://www.webofcreation.org/educationipolicystatementsicolor.htm> (accessed
Mar. 7, 2002).
46 See
USDA Forest Service, Federal Actwns to Address Environmental
Justice
In
Minority
Populatrons
and
Low-Income
PopuLations
<http://www.fs.fed.usIlandlenvjust.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002).
47Id.
48 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 39658 (ensuring that the public, who will be ultimately
impacted by the agency decisions, are involved early on in the process so that

14

ALBANY LAW ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK JRNL.

[Vol. 7

revising its public involvement policy for the first time in 19
years in response to environmental justice concerns.49
California also emphasized public participation.
The
California EPA (IICal EPA II ) is required to assure fair treatment
in all of its activities, including taking steps to lI[elnsure greater
public participation in the Agency's development, adoption, and
implementation of environmental regulations and policies. 1I50
Prior to the energy cnSlS, the CEC first addressed
environmental justice in a case involving the siting of a new
power plant in Bayview-Hunters Point in 1996.51 While the
Commission rejected the environmental justice challenge on the
substantive merits, it accepted that it was obligated to comply
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as an agency partially
funded by federal money. 52 Subsequently the staff has generated
an internal policy for addressing environmental justice
concerns. 53
Governor Davis implemented his initiative to increase
generation by demolishing public participation in facility siting.
Normally, the CEC engages in at least a yearlong process before
a power plant can be sited. 54 In the usual contested case the
Commission takes at least eighteen months or longer.55
Power plants potentially impact all environmental media, air,
water and soil, and therefore require a complex and
comprehensive environmental analysis. Power plants are
complicated machines that need to be assessed as to land use
requirements, seismic safety, hazardous materials use and waste
discharge, public health, impact to aquatic or land based flora
their concerns are properly addressed) [hereinafter "Draft Recipient Guidance").
49Id. at 82335-82345.
50 See Cal EPA, PRC 72000(c) Mission for Programs, Policies and Standards
<http://www.arb.ca.govlbluebooklBBOllPRCI72000.htm> (accessed Jan. 10,
2002).
51 CEC, S.F. Energy Company Cogeneration Project, Application for
certification (94-AFC-1) (1994).
52 Alan Ramo, Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Environmental
Justice, Environmental Law News, Vol. 5, No.1, State Bar of California
Environmental Law Section at 28 (Spring 1996).
53 See CEC, Staff Approach to Environmental Justice for Power Plant
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/envLicensing
Cases
justice/stafCenv~ustice_approach.html> (updated Apr. 12, 2002).
54 Cal. Pub.Res. Code § 25540.6.
55 An example of a case exceeding 12 months is the Potrero Power Plant
Project
(00-AFC-4)
at
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/potrero/index.html> (accessed Feb. 14,
2002).
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and fauna, among other issues.56 The process is thus approved
under state law to be a certified program equivalent to an
environmental impact report process under the California
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and similar to a NEPA
Environmental Impact Statement.57
The normal twelve-month process includes at least six months
of discovery, including information requests (interrogatories)
from all parties. The Commission staff is expected to produce a
preliminary and final staff assessment that resembles an
environmental impact report over a seven-month period. At least
three months are devoted to analyzing the assessments,
preparing testimony and conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Normally the Commission within the next two months would
produce a proposed decision, which would Illl1D.lC an
environmental impact report, allow a thirty-day comment period,
and then issue a final decision.58
Soon after the crisis began, the State Legislature passed
legislation creating a six-month process pursuant to AB 970,
presumably for facilities that do not potentially cause adverse
environmental impacts, much like a negative declaration under
CEQA or a Finding of No Significant Impact under NEPA. Six
months is brutally short for a power plant review. Apparently, it
was not short enough. Thus, the legislature in AB 970 and later
in SB 28X; adopted a four-month procedure for simple cycle
power plants requiring a finding of no impacts and that they be
in service within the year 2002.59 Even then, the Governor
wanted to speed up the time for peaking power plants.GO The
Energy Commission, under the authority of the Governor's
executive order, adopted a twenty-one day procedure for peaker
See Draft Recipient Guidance, supra n. 43.
See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25541.5; see also Mountain Lion Foundation us.
Fish and Game Com., 16 Cal. 4th 105 for certified program requirements.
58 See Model Timeline in CEC, Public Adviser's Presentation on Siting
Process
at
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl1999.0415_public_adviser.html> (accessed Feb. 27, 2002).
59 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25550, 25550.5, 25552; see also 20 Cal. Admin.
Code Title 20, § 2021 (2002).
60 "Peaker power plants are usually employed to produce power during the
peak demand period of the day or when there is not enough energy available in
the state's energy system to meet statewide demand. Simple-cycle peaker
plants are typically twice as polluting as combined cycle baseload plants.
POWER Against the PEOPLE? Mouing Beyond Crisis Planning in California
Energy, A Report of the Latino Issues Forum, November 2001 at 2
<http://www.lif.org> (accessed Mar. 6, 2002).
56

57
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power plants on line by September 30, 2001. 61
Six months is considerably short for the public to participate.
The CEC staff must submit its preliminary environmental
analysis within seventy-five days. The staff must then submit its
final report within forty-five days, presumably after noticing a
workshop, holding it, obtaining and reviewing public comments
and then preparing a report. Other public agencies must
comment within twenty-five days of receiving the staffs initial
report. That leaves fifteen days for everyone to prepare for
evidentiary hearings, whom have little room for more than a day
of hearings. Twenty days thereafter, the Commission must issue
its proposed decision. No later than fifteen days, comments are
due on the proposed decision and fifteen days thereafter the
Commission must make a final decision.
A four-month process makes a six-month process seem
leisurely. To qualify for the four-month procedure, a facility
must be a simple cycle natural gas facility, be online and
operational by December 31, 2002, use BACT to control air
emissions, not have significant adverse public health or
environmental impacts, not be a major stationary source, and not
convert to a combined cycle or cogeneration facility within three
years, among other requirements. 62
These restrictions make the four-month process somewhat
more reasonable, unless one believes a facility does not qualify
and wants to dispute the application. At that point, for a power
plant licensing process, administrative review proceeds at a
breakneck pace. Under the four-month procedure, the staff
normally makes a recommendation as to whether the facility is
qualified for a four-month review within fifteen days, with a
hearing normally held about ten days later. Thus, the staffs
environmental assessment is not even filed until thirty-five days
later. Within the next ten days, the staff holds a public workshop
61 See CEC, California Emergency Siting Peaker Power Plant Permitting
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/peakers> (updated Dec. 19, 2001).
Executive Order D-28-01 Mar. 2001 authorized the Energy Commission to
waive all timelines for facilities covered by D-22-01, D-24-01 and D-25-01 and
specifically authorized emergency procedures for peakers able to be online by
September 30, 2001, setting the stage for the 21 day process ordered by the
Energy Commission. D-40-01 issued on June 11, 2001, authorized facilities to
operate beyond any state permit limit if necessary and if a mitigation payment
was paid to the State.
62 See infra Section VI regarding the attempt by the Energy Commission to
jettison these restrictions on the four-month process.
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and ten days after that, evidentiary hearings begin before the
Commission. Twenty days later the Commission proposes a
decision and ten days thereafter the Commission makes a final
decision. 63
The twenty-one day process was truly devoid of any pretense of
meaningful participation. Under that process, a public hearing
could occur within two days of a public notice regarding the
project. Other public agencies are given only two weeks to
comment on the proposal. The CEC staff may have as little as
two days to develop their own analysis after that, with the
commission issuing a final decision without any comment period
as short as two days later.54
Any member of the public participating in these kinds of
intensive regulatory proceedings will barely have enough time to
thoroughly review each document, solicit and obtain expert
assistance, prepare comments or testimony, and then participate
in a hearing in any kind of meaningful matter. Timing is critical
for public participation. The EPA in its Recipient Guidance calls
for early public involvement, even before the permitting process
formally begins.65 The EPA has also noted that not only must
public participation begin early, it must be allowed to occur ,vith
sufficient time to make comments effective and meaningful,
including thirty days for comment on documents and forty-five
days where there is a public hearing, extending to sixty days or
more for complex documents or projects.66
General California public participation guidelines are
consistent with the proposed federal guidelines. Comment
periods on negative declarations (equivalent to a Finding of No
Significant Impact under NEPA) issued by state agencies are to
last at least thirty days. For a draft environmental impact report,
state agencies usually allow for forty-five days.67
These
guidelines are applicable to agencies implementing CEQA such
63 See CEC,4-Month Power Plant Licensing Process Workshop for CPA
Bidders, September 28, 2001 at 19 <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl4month-processl2001-09-28
(RICHINSPRESENT.PDF)
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl2001-05-31>
(LICENSE_SCHEDULE.PDF) (accessed Feb. 27, 2002).
54 See CEC, California Emergency Power Plant Permitting, Table ill
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslpeakersldocumentsl2001
-03-15_EMERGENCY_MEMO.PDF> Gast updated Mar. 13, 2002).
65 See Cal. Govt. Code § 39658.
66 See Goal4(e) in U.S. EPA, Draft Public Involvement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg.
82335, 82342 (Dec. 28, 2000).
67 14 C.C.R 15073(a), 15105.
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as the CEC.
Under these guidelines, the CEC's process flunks. Under all of
the processes, the public is excluded until an application for
certification is filed. The twenty-one day process does not
pretend to meet even the minimal requirements of a thirty-day
comment period, let alone the forty-five days when there is a
hearing. In the four-month process, hearings on a project's
eligibility for this speeded up process, evidentiary hearings on
the merits of the project, and hearings on the Commission's
proposed decision are all within thirty days of key documents
being released for public comment or review. The Commission
requires comments on its proposed decision within ten days
before a hearing, and a decision is issued ten days thereafter.
The six-month process is little better. Evidentiary hearings
are held within ten days of the filing of the final staff assessment.
A hearing on the Commission's Proposed Decision is held within
ten days of its release to the public.
Only the twelve-month process begins to allow sufficient time
for public participation. Even then, evidentiary hearings are
normally within thirty days of the final staff assessment release,
not forty-five days as suggested by the US EPA in its Draft
Public Involvement Policy. A hearing on the Commission's
proposed decision is held within fifteen days.
Public participation, even if given all the time needed, is not
sufficient to provide environmental justice if it is not meaningful.
If the decision-makers are a stacked deck, controlled by politics
as opposed to law and science, those without traditional political
power will lose out, further exacerbating environmental injustice.
In California, the CEC is a body appointed by the Governor.
Governor Davis actively interceded when it appeared a power
plant proposal was in jeopardy. In San Jose, the City Council at
one point voted to oppose a new CalPine power plant. Governor
Davis soon called for its passage, and eventually the City Council
acceded to the Governor's pressure. Within the Commission, the
San Jose Mercury reported that staff analysts' reports were
rewritten, and those analysts who would not allow their
testimony to be changed were taken off the project. The CEC
then approved the project.68
68 See Levey, Calpine wins approval for new project, San Jose Mercury News,
Sept. 25, 2001; Wilson, San Jose Council Gives Green Light to generating plant;
VOTE REVERSAL: Officials Pressured to OK project, The S.F. ehron. Al (June
6, 2001); see also Levey, Officials rejected Calpine criticism: Commission
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Recently, in another case, the CEC Chair defended his agency's
consideration of an expansion of a power plant in a low income,
predominantly African-American community in San Francisco
before an angry workshop audience. He stated, "[O]ne of the
great benefits of new power plants statewide is that we're going
to shut down the old polluting power plants" and "we're for
modern efficient power plants."69 Since the Commission was not
proposing to shut down the older power plants in the community
but merely expand an existing facility, community members
attending the workshop were not pleased, to say the least.
The Commission also attempted to curtail what had been
extensive rights by members of the public to intervene as a party
in siting cases.70 Originally the Commission proposed to make
evidentiary hearings discretionary and allow the Commission's
presiding member to rigidly control an intervenor's right to
present evidence and examine or cross-examine witnesses. These
modifications would put the rights of interveners at the discretion
of the presiding member of the siting case.71 That effort now
appears to have been beaten back after a large coalition of
community groups protested in comments and at a hearing. It
demonstrates, however, the inclination of the Commission to
curtail public participation, even without any evidence that
procedural due process safeguards had improperly denied even
one MW of capacity to the State.
Community groups have nevertheless been successfully
asserting environmental justice challenges, but only over the
resistance of state authorities. In not one case has the
Commission agreed, except when the South Coast Air Quality
Management District refused to give a permit to a large
uncontrolled peaker plant in. the middle of a proposed park
area.72 Community groups have had to sidestep the Commission,
pushed for positive report, San Jose Mercury News (Apr. 14, 2001).
69 See August 13, 200l-Potrero Power Plant Project Committee Conference
Transcript. (Adobe Acrobat PDF file, 155 pages, 196 kilobytes) RT 37, 38
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslpotreroldocumentsrmdex.html> (accessed
Mar. 7, 2002).
70 Under 20 C.C.R. § 1712(a) (stating that "any person may petition to
intervene" in a siting case).
71 See
Docket
Number
0l-SIT-1
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitinglrulemakingldocumentsrmdex.html> (accessed
Mar. 7, 2002).
72 La Jolla Baldwin Peaking Project (Ol-EP-ll); see also the list of withdrawn
projects at <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslwithdrawn.html> (accessed
Jan. 4, 2002).
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reaching out to city governments or, in one case, using a
referendum. 73 In San Francisco, an ordinance was adopted
preventing the City from approving or agreeing to facilitate a
fossil fuel power plant unless it reduced pollution, replaced older
more polluting facilities and provided community mitigation. 74
Nevertheless, eleven twenty-one day peaker process facilities and
fourteen twelve-month power plants have been approved since
1999.

VI. !'EAKER PLANTS: A Focus OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
The most pernicious element of the effort to expand fossil fuel
capacity in California is the reliance upon so-called peaker
plants. These simple cycle power plants often have little or no
pollution controls. Some plants already in existence, including
those proposed for expanded operations, burn other fuels such as
distillate oil, which is far more polluting than natural gas.
The Davis administration utilized these smaller plants to
quickly upgrade capacity, either by building new ones or freeing
existing ones from permits that limited their operations, due to
their lack of controls and excessive pollution. Under Davis'
executive orders, the Commission succeeded in implementing the
twenty-one day review process for peakers that could be online by
September 30, 2001. An attempt to further ease the restrictions
for other peakers under the emergency four-month process was
reversed only after a rapid mobilization by community
organizations and larger environmental organizations. 75
The ISO, at the urging of the administration, also proposed
that older peakers that burn distillate oil be freed from permit
restrictions on hours of operations. For example, the ISO
directed the Mirant company to operate its peakers located at its
San Francisco Potrero power plant whenever requested by the
ISO, or whenever necessary for Mirant to fulfill any contractual
obligations for electricity. The peakers together totaled 150 MW
73 See Soller, The State, the New Nimbys Are Taking Back Their Backyardsand Their Air, 6 L.A. Times M6 (Mar. 18, 2001).
74 S.F., Cal., Human Health and Environmental Protections for New Electric
Generation, Ordinance 124-01 (May 29, 2001)
75 State Ends Fast Tracking for Some Power Plants, Ventura County Star
A18 (Dec. 6, 2001); see also CEC, Final Staff Draft Resolution
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/4-month_processl200 1-1205_draftresolution.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002) (rescinding resolution 011017-02 and subjecting all power plants to review in accord with the California
Environmental Quality Air).
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with permits that allowed them to be operated for 877 hours, no
more than about one month over a year.
The permit requirements, however, were incorporated into a
federal Title V permit issued pursuant to the Federal Clean Air
Act based upon limitations on hours of operations in the federally
approved State Implementation Plan. That is, these were federal
requirements. The US EPA and the local Bay Area Air Quality
Management District ("BAAQMD") tried to immunize the
violation by signing adminjstrative enforcement agreements
calling for mitigation payments in lieu of compliance. However,
even FERC eventually balked at the idea that an ISO could
direct a company to violate its federal permit.76
Further exacerbating the problem, Mirant's units were near a
predominantly low-income African-American community. Once
the US EPA, the BAAQMD and Mirant announced the
enforcement agreements to the public after they were a fait
accompli, community organizations were outraged. As soon as
the permit limits were exceeded, three of these groups sued. 77
Mirant soon agreed to stop operating in violation of its permit
and signed a proposed consent decree requiring it to comply ,vith
Mirant's permit. However, even then, the Davis administration
would not relent. Its Air Resources Board ("ARB"), in an unusual
maneuver for an air pollution agency, tried at the last minute to
delay entry of the consent decree that only enforced the
company's permit air pollution limits. The ARB claimed to be
concerned with reliability issues; however, the federal judge was
not persuaded and eventually entered the decree. 78
Potrero's situation is unfortunately representative of a pattern
in California, according to a recent study by the Latino Issues
Forum, entitled "POWER Against the PEOPLE: Moving Beyond
Crisis Planning in California Energy."79 The study looked at
eighteen planned or approved power plants, mostly peakers
(seventeen) in California since deregulation.
The study
76 San Diego Gas & Electric Company (2001) 96 F.E.R.C. P 61,117 (Mirant
Request for Clarification).
77 Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates et aL v. Mirant Potrero LLC
et al., (N.D. Cal. 2001) Case No. 01-cv-02348; see also Gordon. Potrero Hill
Power Plant Hit By 2 Lawsuits; Neighbors City Ask Court To Cut Back Hours of
Operation, The S.F. Chron. Al3 (June 20, 2001).
78 See
court
docket
through
PACER
database
at
<http://pacer.cand.uscourts.gov/> (accessed Mar. 6, 2002).
79 See Ramo supra n. 52 (stating that power plants in California are often
sited in neighborhood populated by minorities).

22

ALBANY LAW ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK JRNL.

[Vol. 7

demonstrated that these facilities are being disproportionately
sited in communities of color. Two-thirds of the plants contained
fifty percent or more people of color within a six-mile radius from
the plant. Latinos were highly over-represented, followed by
Blacks. so
While there may be many plausible reasons for
disproportionate siting, such as the location of existing facilities
such as switchyards and natural gas pipelines, land use zoning,
or the location of open space suitable for a large power plant, the
whole approach is questionable given studies suggesting there
may be alternatives beyond fossil fuel.
For example,
Communities for a Better Environment ("CBE") recently
analyzed energy needs in San Francisco, isolated on a peninsula
with only one transmission corridor available, and determined
that fossil fuel could actually be reduced from the current
proposed 903 MW to as few as 167 MW if the transmission
system was upgraded and solar, efficiency, wind and other green
alternatives were pursued.sl
Professor Karina Garbesi of
Hayward State University in California, in a report prepared for
community groups commenting on Mirant's Potrero power plant
licensing in San Francisco, demonstrated that even in fog
shrouded San Francisco there was a potential of at least 240 to
600 MW from a commitment to solar power and another 300 MW
could result from incorporating efficiency in construction.s2
The Davis administration never seriously pursued these
alternatives. To make renewables, a viable option required
reversing the impact of deregulation, including a substantial
commitment of state subsidies. The Legislature, in 2000, finally
authorized a substantial commitment to conservation efforts for
one year in the amount of $909 million dollars. However, these
emergency appropriations do not include any future
commitments to DSM, which averaged $500 million dollars a
80 Id. at 10 (featuring statistics which support fmding that power plants are
located in minority neighborhoods).
81 Communities for a Better Environment, Power & Justice: Electricity,
environment, race, class and health in San Francisco, California, November,
2001 <http://www.cbecal.org/publications/poweIjustice.htm> (accessed Mar. 6,
2002).
82 Karina Garbesi and Emily Bartholmew, The Potential for Solar Electricity
Generation in San Francisco (June 1, 2001); see also Green and Garbesi, The
Potential to Reduce the City of San Francisco's Electricity Demand Through
Implementation of Commercially Available Energy Efficient Technologies, July
1, 2001 <http://www.Californiasolar.center/pdfs/sfpv.pdf> (accessed Mar. 6,
2002).
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year. It will take that kind of continued commitment to achieve
the potential suggested in the Garbesi studies on a statewide
basis. Furthermore, the utilities in a competitive market have
an incentive to sell as much electricity as possible, destroying the
prior incentive to support efficiency. Thus $72M in funds
allocated for utility DSM programs was left unspent in 1998 and
1999.83
The Legislature on September 30, 2000, also passed AB 995
and SB 1194 authorizing an additional expenditure of $675M
from 2002 through 2007 for renewable energy sources. This
measure will not increase the amount of support per year
provided in the original deregulation statutes. However, it does
In addition, the
allocate more funding to new capacity.
legislature also adopted AB 29, which included $95 million over
two years as an incentive, a short-term increase of 33% over a
two-year period.
However, as discussed above, these short-term measures
remain relatively modest compared to the historic subsidy given
to fossil fuel generation and the far more significant amount for
stranded costs, and thus cannot offset the push towards new
fossil fuel capacity supported by California. The bottom line is
that Davis' crisis management approach has made California's
new generation capacity primarily natural gas.84 California
provided some support for renewables and conservation, however
the program as a whole has disproportionately pushed
centralized fossil fueled power plants into communities of color.
VII. LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

It is striking that within one year of adopting an
environmental justice policy, California officials quickly
overlooked environmental justice as soon as there was a crisis. It
is not as if the Legislature had not expressed its views regarding
the need to incorporate environmental justice in energy siting
regardless of this fact for instance in California Public Resources
Codes sections 25550 (g) and 25550.5(g).85 Yet disproportionate
See Cal Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess.
A list of new power plants approved since 1999 by the CEC is at
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslapproved.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002).
- 85 See CAL Pub_ Res. §25550 (g) (stating that: "With respect to a thermal
power plant and related facilities reviewed under the process established by
this chapter, it shall be shown that the thermal power plant and related
83
84
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siting with inadequate public participation processes became the
norm.
Furthermore, California's energy crisis policy makers did not
include representatives of the communities most impacted.
California's chief energy advisors themselves criticized the ISO
for its dominance by industry interests:
Many board members sell power or own generation facilities
and therefore have an interest in keeping prices high. None of
them has a duty to serve the California public interest. The ISO
board is also self-perpetuating: it appoints its own members,
subject only to approval by the EOB and the FERC.86
In fact, many of Governor Davis' closest advisors were from the
energy industry, investing in fossil fuel companies while
determining where the state should obtain its energy.87 It is not
therefore surprising that the crisis policy relied upon fossil fuel
power plants that were disproportionately sited in communities
of color.
Another social dynamic may have been at play. Whether
unconsciously,88 negligently,89 or through the "paths" or "scripts"
of institutional racism. 90 Racism can work without intention or
through callous neglect. 91 Thus federal civil rights law bans not
only intentional discrimination by statute, but through
regulation, unintentional discrimination whose impact IS
facilities complies with all regulations adopted by the commission that ensure
that an application addresses disproportionate impacts in a manner consistent
with Section 65040.12 of the Government Code." Section 25550.5 (g)
applicability to repowering an existing facility is similar).
86 See Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at § 5.
87 See Nissenbaum, Another Adviser Linked to Possible Conflict; Davis Asks
Watchdog Agency to Investigate, San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 25, 2001, State
and Regional News (discussing Davis' request that the California Fair Political
Practices Commission investigate conflicts of interest for 11 members of its
energy team after Davis had fired 5 members who owned stock in power
companies); see also State Officials Ethics in Question, San Jose Mercury News,
Aug. 15, 2001, State and Regional News (discussing potential conflicts of
interest of Chair of Energy Commission and others).
88 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987) (showing that institutional
racism is even present in a kindergarten classroom).
89 Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U.Pa. L. Rev. 899 (1993).
90 Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 Yale L. J. 1717 (2000).
91 See discussion of unconscious racism as a more typical source of
environmental racism in today's society in Evans, Challenging the Racism in
Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1219
(1998).
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disparate and unwarranted.92
The USEPA therefore
recommends staff training as a key activity to assure compliance
with Title VI.93
The failure of California's energy planning to avoid
disproportionate siting of fossil fuel plants or the erosion of
public participation rights suggests that environmental justice
was not a key. concern of decision-makers. Explicit statutory
policies were' insufficient, as were any disincentives from
potential lawsuits, which now seem limited to only the most
blatant acts of intentional discrimination.94
Beyond environmental justice, California's energy crisis makes
clear other perils of crisis management. Once emergency powers
are granted to government, it is difficult to take them away.
Governor Davis and his administration are now resisting calling
an end to the crisis, even though the State Senate, the CEC and
widespread media have declared an end to the crisis. 95 The
emergency order is still in effect and will remain so unless there
is a change of heart in the administration.
Further, the decisions made in a crisis may outlast the crisis.
Unless there is an escape clause or sunset provision, one may
have to tolerate these decisions for a long time. California is now
begging for people to buy electricity so that electricity contracted
for at relatively high prices (though below peak prices) can be
somewhat reimbursed. 96 It is increasingly dependent upon
natural gas, a source of serious price fluctuations, and mired in
centralized fossil fuel generation owned by out of state
generators.

VIII. CONCLUSION
During California's energy crisis, the administration and
legislature erred in eviscerating environmental justice and
92 See generally 40 C.F.R § 7.35(b) (showing Title VI regulations); see also
Mank, Title VI, The Law of Environmental Justice Ch. 2 (M. Gerrard, ed.
1999).
93 See 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 at 39657 (showing Draft Recipient Guidance).
94 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001); 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26822; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
95 Lynda Gledhill, Crisis Dims, But Davis' Powers Longer; Legislators,
Environmentalists Say Broad Authority Invites Abuse, The S.F. Cbron. AI (Dec.
3,2001).
96 Mark Martin and Lynda Gledhill, A Year Later; Paying the Price of Power:
After the State Spends Billions, PG&E Faces Bankruptcy and Rates Soar, the
Cost of Keeping the Lights on Hits Home, The S.F. Cbron. Al (Dec. 23, 2001).
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maintaining a privatized energy system still capable of
disruption.
Centralized fossil fuel power plants were
disproportionately sited in communities of color without
adequate public participation as transmission upgrades and
green alternatives were downplayed. Emergency actions and
powers were adopted without sufficient guarantees they would
expire once the crisis abated. Government prior to a crisis needs
to assure that environmental justice becomes an explicit and
conscious responsibility of policy makers, and once the crisis
begins, that emergency actions and policies maintain this
commitment and incorporate sunset provisions or escape clauses.

